Protection and Cybersecurity of Command Posts in Contemporary Armed Conflicts
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1
Faculty of Military Studies, War Studies University (Akademia Sztuki Wojennej), Poland
2
19 Brygada Zmechanizowana / 19th Mechanized Brigade
Submission date: 2025-12-02
Acceptance date: 2026-03-20
Publication date: 2026-07-13
Corresponding author
Krzysztof Wysocki
Faculty of Military Studies, War Studies University (Akademia Sztuki Wojennej), al. gen. Antoniego Chruściela „Montera” 103, 00-910, Warsaw, Poland
Cybersecurity and Law 2026;1:143-155
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ABSTRACT
Objectives:
The aim of this article is to examine key determinants of protecting and securing Command Posts (CPs) in multi-domain conflict environments, with emphasis on lessons from the Armed Forces of Ukraine (2022–2025). The study identifies how integrating physical, electromagnetic, informational, and cyber protection enhances CP survivability and ensures command continuity under coordinated kinetic, cyber, and electronic attacks. It also proposes a conceptual model of integrated, multi-layered CP protection relevant to NATO forces and adaptable to Polish Armed Forces requirements.
Methods:
The research is based on qualitative analysis, including doctrinal interpretation, comparative review of NATO, U.S., and Ukrainian publications, and synthesis of empirical observations from the Russo-Ukrainian war. Examination of doctrinal documents, analytical reports, and scientific studies enabled the identification of patterns of CP vulnerabilities and protection measures. Methods employed included content analysis, deductive reasoning, and cross-domain synthesis.
Results:
The results show that traditional, static, high-emission CPs are no longer viable in environments saturated with ISR sensors, SIGINT/ELINT, precision fires, and cyber-electromagnetic threats. Ukrainian experience confirms that survivability relies on mobility, dispersion, electromagnetic discipline, and active cyber defense. CP protection must function as a multi-layered system spanning physical, informational, electromagnetic, and cyber domains. Integrating MILDEC, OPSEC, EMCON, and cloud-based C2 architectures reduces adversary targeting effectiveness.
Conclusions:
The study concludes that CP protection requires abandoning centralized models in favor of distributed, mobile, low-signature structures within a unified all-domain protection framework. Only integrated protection—combining engineering measures, signature reduction, mobility, redundancy, cyber resilience, and MILDEC/OPSEC—ensures CP survivability in modern conflicts and aligns with the NATO ADC2 concept.